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Aguirre v. Elko County Sheriff’s Office, 138 Nev, Adv. Op. 32 (May 5, 2022)1
APPLICABILITY OF THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION IN FORFEITURE CLAIMS
WHERE THE DECLARANT IS INCARCERATED
Summary
In an opinion drafted by Justice Cadish, the Court considered whether Nevada’s
homestead exemption protects real property from civil forfeiture and whether an incarcerated
individual who records a homestead declaration while serving their prison sentence qualifies as a
bona fide resident of the homestead property. Aguirre asserted that he recorded his homestead
declaration before any final process occurred in the forfeiture cause of action against him, thus
having his declaration preempt the forfeiture. The district court dismissed the appellant’s
argument, rationalizing that the appellant did not comply with the residency requirement because
he made his homestead declarations while he was incarcerated. However, the Court held that
there is no forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption, stating that incarcerated individuals
may still qualify as residents for purposes of the homestead exemption. Here, the Court
concluded that the appellant’s declaration complied with NRS 115.020, finding that the district
court erred in entering a judgment of forfeiture.

Facts and Procedural History
This opinion comes from an appeal from an Eighth Judicial District Court order issuing a
judgment of forfeiture against the appellant. In 2016, Aguirre was conveyed a home and real
property in Nevada. In October 2017, Aguirre was arrested for trafficking-controlled substances
after a search of the property revealed over 80 grams of heroin. In the following month, the
Sheriff’s Office filed a complaint for forfeiture of the property as the proceedings were halted
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pending resolution of Aguirre’s criminal charges. While incarcerated, Aguirre stated his intent to
claim the property as a homestead, but in August 2018, the court accepted Aguirre’s guilty plea.
The Sheriff then moved for summary judgment on the forfeiture claim, claiming that Aguirre’s
declaration was invalid since Aguirre did not physically reside at the property himself when he
made it. Aguirre argued that by excluding his allodial title would indicate that the Legislature
intended for homestead protections to preempt forfeiture of real property held under other forms
of title. The district court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment. The district court
concluded that Aguirre did not “substantially comply” with NRS 115.010’s requirements
because he was incarcerated, finding that forfeiture was proper because Aguirre committed a
drug offense at the property and awarding the Sheriff a judgment of forfeiture.

Discussion
The Nevada Constitution provides that “[a] homestead as provided by law, shall be
exempt from forced sale under any process of law.”2 The Constitution creates two specific
exceptions to the homestead exemption: (1) that “no property shall be exempt from sale for [1]
taxes or [2] for the payment of obligations contracted for the purchase of said premises, or (2) for
the erection of improvements thereon.”3 The Court details that NRS 115.010(1) codifies the
general rule exempting homesteads from any "forced sale on execution or any final process from
any court," while NRS115.010(3) codifies the constitutional exceptions to the homestead
exemption.
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NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 30.
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A valid homestead is exempt from civil forfeiture
The Sheriff argues that the Property would be subject to forfeiture regardless of any
declarations because it was used in connection to a drug trafficking crime. It also asserts that
public policy warrants creating a forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption thus thwarting
the goal of the homestead exemption.4 However, the Court strikes down this sentiment by
clarifying that in Breedlove, the homesteader invoked the exemption to avoid paying a childsupport judgment and that the homesteader acted in bad faith consistently. The Court further
clarifies that although they do not condone drug crimes, the case at hands revolves around the
homestead statute, which is meant to protect families against homelessness. 5 Despite the
Sheriff’s arguments, the Court continues to rationalize that the exemption protects against
“calamitous circumstances,” which likely included protecting the homestead when the declarant
is arrested as it also protects the declarant’s family. The Court rejected the Sheriff’s argument,
reversing.

Aguirre satisfied NRS 115.020, and thus, the Property is a constitutionally protected
homestead
The Sheriff further contended that Aguirre failed to satisfy NRS 115.020(2)(b), which
requires a homestead declarant to state that they are residing on the premises, relying on Nilsson.
Aguirre, however, argued that the Property is his bona fide residence and that he intended to
continue residing there before and after his incarceration. The Court further stated that because
Aguirre’s incarceration is a temporary absence, the residency requirement was satisfied for the
exemption.6 With this said, his use of the Property for a commercial purpose does not preclude
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homestead protection. The Court also clarifies that, under NRS 115.020(2)(a) and (c), a single
declarant must state that he or she is a householder and that he or she intends to use and claim the
property as a homestead, finding that Aguirre did, in fact, declare his intention to reside in the
homestead in a “timely and established” manner qualifying his declaration as homestead
exemption that protects the Property from forfeiture.

Conclusion
The Court concludes their opinion by reemphasizing that “[p]ublic policy does not warrant
creating a civil forfeiture exception to the homestead exemption” and that “incarcerated
individuals may still be deemed residents for purposes of the homestead exemption.” Therefore,
the Court held that Aguirre’s amended declaration established that he qualified as a bona fide
resident of the Property since he lived there before his incarceration and intended to live there
upon his release, thus complying with NRS 115.020, entitling him to the protection of the
exemption. Thereafter, the Court reversed the district court’s judgment of forfeiture.

